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Beyond Brigden: Australia’s Pre-War Manufacturing Tariffs, 
Real Wages and Economic Size 
 
Abstract 
 Like many industrialised economies in the pre-depression era, Australia elected to 
maintain a highly protectionist trade policy regime and hence to retard its integration with the 
global economy.  The rationale for Australia’s protectionism was, as elsewhere, the 
enhancement of worker welfare.  The Brigden Report offered a pre-Stolper-Samuelson 
recognition that protection of labour intensive industries would bolster Australia’s real wage, 
though the Report did not highlight the further consequence that this would attract European 
migrants.  Brigden’s wage effect mirrors the subsequent Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model yet it has still more advanced elements.  We 
illustrate it using the strict two-sector HOS model and a more modern version with 
differentiated products, three sectors, including a non-traded services sector, natural resources 
as a specific factor and foreign ownership of domestic capital.  While ever production remains 
diversified, the HOS model with elastic migration does not support a unique link between a 
single region’s protection and its labour endowment.  The more modern model does yield this 
link, however, suggesting that protection might indeed have fostered, at least temporarily, 
immigration, capital inflow and overall economic expansion in Australia. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The Australian Tariff: an Economic Enquiry, often known as the Brigden Report, was 
to prove an enduring landmark in the economic history of Australia, and even, according to 
some, in the development of “modern” trade theory.1  The Report was occasioned by the 
burgeoning of protectionist sentiment and action in Australia in the aftermath of the First 
World War.  Immediately post-war there had been a global economic slump with rising 
unemployment, which saw declines in “internationalist” sentiment in the advanced economies 
and a tendency to raise barriers to flows of both goods and migrants.  In addition, the 
Australian economy did not see the boom of the 1920s enjoyed by parts of Europe and North 
America.  Indeed, high unemployment threatened throughout this period, and governments 
saw import substitution through protection as a means of raising employment.  The average 
tariff rate rose from about 10 percent in 1918 to about 20 per cent by 1927 (Dollery and 
Whitten 1998). 
This rise in protection provoked a variety of reactions.  The Economic Record’s first 
issue (November 1925) carried J.B. Brigden’s ‘The Australian Tariff and the Standard of 
Living’ (Brigden, 1925) that advanced the heterodox thesis that a tariff might enhance the 
                                                 
1 See Stolper and Samuelson (1941), Cain (1973), Manger (1981), Samuelson (1981), Irwin (1996) and 
Samuelson (1987 and 1994).  Cain, Manger and Irwin all note the report’s contribution to trade theory, while the 
Samuelson articles refer to the associated publications by the reports authors. 
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living standard of the average inhabitant.2  It aroused the first controversy in the Record, and 
Brigden sparred with free trade advocates such as Benham in that journal through the mid 
twenties3. 
The Prime Minister, Stanley Melbourne Bruce was a comparatively moderate 
protectionist on the conservative side of politics who appears to have had increasing 
reservations about the wisdom of the protectionist trend.  “The cry of ‘Let is make everything 
in Australia’ is quite enough to prevent [men] seeing the effect of a policy of that character 
carried to extremes” (in MacDougall 1986, p. 443).  Bruce wanted a ‘scientific protection’.  
The notion of applying scientific methods to problems of national welfare was a popular at the 
time.  Indeed, shortly beforehand, Bruce had brought to fruition something that resembled the 
'national laboratory' that had been earlier championed by Prime Minister Billy Hughes, who 
had been awed by German technological prowess.  In 1926 Bruce introduced legislation for a 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). 
At the same time, Bruce saw that a corresponding council of economic scientists 
might promise to be equally useful.  In this spirit, in September 1927, he asked L.F. Giblin, 
C.H. Wickens, and E.C. Dyason to undertake a statistical investigation of the effects and 
success of tariff policy.  In mid December 1927 this group of three invited J.B. Brigden and 
D.B. Copland to join them.  This was to result in The Australian Tariff: an Economic Inquiry, 
or “The Brigden Report”.  This volume appeared on 19 July 1929.  Its conclusion is distinctly 
presented on its first page: in Australia’s present circumstances free trade would lower the 
“standard of living”, that is, the real wage.  Protection should therefore be retained, or even 
increased. 
Later in the year of the report’s publication, Stanley Bruce lost government to the 
Labor Party, headed by James Scullin.  The moderate protectionist spirit of Bruce’s term of 
government was cast aside.  The Scullin government adopted protectionism as its principal 
economic policy instrument, a platform that had been endorsed, if only weakly, by the 
Brigden Report.  By 1931-32, Australia’s average tariff had increased from 1929’s 20 per cent 
to 30 per cent (Dollery and Whitten 1998). 
In this paper we examine the effects of Australia’s protection ca 1930 with particular 
attention to its role in attracting both migrant labour and capital to the country and hence in 
expanding its economy.  We do so first in the context of the subsequently prominent 
                                                 
2 Brigden was more precise than this, referring to the median Australian as depending on labour income.  The 
report therefore had strong distributional overtones. 
3 See Benham (1926), and Brigden (1927a) and (1927b). 
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Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model of trading regions and then via a more modern 
three sector model that incorporates differentiated home products, a specific factor (land and 
natural resources) and a non-traded sector (services).  The potential for protection to be 
expansionary is demonstrated.  The section to follow offers a brief review of the Brigden case 
for protection.  In Section 3, the HOS model is used to examine the effects of achieving the 
Brigden objective most directly, via labour market policy and, subsequently, through 
protection.  Section 4 then applies the more modern model to links between protection, the 
real wage and overall economic size.  Brief conclusions are offered in Section 5. 
 
2. The Brigden Case 
The trenchancy of the Brigden Report’s thesis is not matched by the lucidity of its 
argument.  It was a “compromise document” in which differences of opinion were concealed.  
This commitment to compromise discouraged any attempt to secure agreement to some 
clearly stated argument.  But what argument there is stands inspired by Brigden’s case for 
protection in the Economic Record.4  As Giblin recalled 20 years after its publication, Brigden 
‘supplied the ideas which were the basis of the more significant part’. 
 The Report seemed to have been preserved from oblivion by an attempt of Karl 
Anderson, written in 1938 to comprehensively dispose of the case for protection.  Anderson 
had absorbed the literature of the time, including Brigden’s “The Australian Tariff and the 
Standard of Living”, and the Brigden Report.  Then, in 1939 Marion Crawford Samuelson 
advanced an effective riposte to Anderson’s attempted rebuttal of the Report (Samuelson 
1939).  But M.C. Samuelson’s paper is almost entirely devoted to the argument that tariffs 
improve the terms of trade in non-small economies.  P.A. Samuelson later wrote “With great 
probability, M.C. had never read the 1929 Report” (1981, p.151).5  In 1941 Samuelson wrote 
with Stolper, and Marion as amanuensis, “Protection and Real Wages”.  In that article he 
reviews the literature on this issue, the great bulk of which is hostile to the thesis that 
protection increases real wages.  He does not refer to the Brigden Report, and later stated that 
he did not read it.  In the conclusion he suggests the Australian economy may be illustrative 
of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, and refers the reader without any further explication to the 
papers of Copland (1931), M.C. Samuelson and Anderson. 
In Brigdens’ argument, labour is assumed to operate with diminishing marginal 
productivity in a “food” sector, but with constant marginal returns in “manufacturing”.  Given 
                                                 
4 The Report is “exasperatingly” “loose and incomplete” (Cain 1973). 
5 By the time of the 1981 article, M.C. Samuelson had sadly passed away. 
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this, increasing tariffs on manufactured imports would not reduce the marginal product of 
labour in manufacturing (by assumption), and so would not reduce the wage in terms of 
manufactures.  However, with the import tariff making manufactures now more valuable in 
terms of food, the marginal product of labour in manufactures evaluated in terms of food is 
now higher.  This induces a reallocation of labour from food towards manufactures.  The 
marginal product of labour in food is thereby increased.  The upshot is that the real wage in 
terms of manufactures is unchanged and that in terms of food wage is increased.  The utility 
of the worker (the ‘standard of living’) must rise as long as the worker consumes some non-
zero quantity of food.6
 Brigden’s argument might be seen as an extreme HOS model where no capital at all 
operates in manufacturing (Coleman et al. 2006).  Alternatively, the constancy of marginal 
returns to labour in manufacturing might be thought of as a consequence of a supply (from 
abroad) of physical capital that is perfectly elastic at some externally determined rate of 
return.  Any movement of labour from food into manufacturing would tend to reduce the 
marginal product of labour but to increase the corresponding marginal product of capital and 
hence induce an inflow of investment.  The result is not only a rise in the real wage relative to 
a general consumer price index but also an expansion of the capital stock and of aggregate 
output.  This latter expansion, though it was ignored by the authors of the report, is examined 
in the following two sections. 
 
3. Raising the Real Wage in the HOS Model 
 The model that gave rise to the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem stems originally from the 
early work of Heckscher (1919), which was complemented and formalised by Ohlin (1933) 
and published in English subsequent to Brigden’s most important works (Brigden 1925, 
Brigden et al. 1929). 
 It is a model of trade in the products of two industries that employ two primary factors 
between two different regions.  The key assumptions of this model are that a) like products 
are homogeneous across regions, b) technologies are common across regions, c) production of 
both goods exhibit constant returns to scale, and d) consumption preferences are homothetic 
and also common across regions.  Consider the following representation of the model.  The 
two homogeneous goods are the relatively labour-intensive X and the relatively capital 
                                                 
6 The proposition is presented more formally in an appendix to Coleman et al. (2005). 
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intensive Y.7  The two factors are labour, L, and capital (which could include or take the form 
of human capital), K, and their unit rewards are w and r.  Imagine first that the distribution of 
the global factor endowment is such that the two regions form an integrated world economy.8  
Let the capital-intensive good, Y, be the numeraire.  Then derive the optimal allocation of 
primary factors across industries by minimising unit cost, subject to the technology.  At the 
same time choose consumption of the two goods by maximising utility, subject to the budget 
constraint. 
These optimisation problems yield univariate monotonic relationships between the 
terms of trade, P=px/py, each unit factor reward, W=w/py and R=r/py, and the factor 
proportions in each industry, Xρ =Lx/Kx and Yρ =Ly/Ky.  In the integrated world economy, 
where all factor markets clear, the total factor employment ratio, Wρ =Lw/Kw (Lw=Lx+Ly , 
Kw=Kx+Ky), is the same as the endowment ratio Eρ =LE/KE.  This, in turn, must be a positively 
weighted average of Xρ  and Yρ .  In total, then, we have a set of monotonic relationships 
between P, W, R and Wρ  that permit relative prices and unit factor rewards to be calculated if 
the integrated economy’s endowment ratio is known.  Two of these are shown in the top two 
quadrants of Figure 1. 
 
Raising the Australian wage via labour market policy: 
 One possible approach to attracting immigrants is to retain high wages through labour 
market policy.  Imagine that the Australian wage, W, is set under the government’s influence 
above the market clearing level.9  To make the wage exogenous and retain a useful model we 
must make something endogenous.  Let that be the global level of employment, Lw.  The same 
model then enables us to calculate the level of unemployment as the difference between the 
true endowment, L, and the equilibrium level of employment, Lw.  The third quadrant in 
Figure 1 emerges.  The diagram is then a variation on that of Brecher (1974a and b).  Setting 
the total factor employment ratio equal to the endowment ratio solves the integrated economy 
with flexible factor rewards.  If the wage is rigid and if it is above its market clearing 
equilibrium level, however, the solution commences with the level of the rigid wage.  In the 
figure, therefore, W0 is a labour market clearing wage since it yields employment ratio Eρ  and 
unemployment, U, is zero.  If the wage is set administratively to W1, however, the higher 
                                                 
7 There are no factor intensity reversals. 
8 We refer to the integrated world economy in the sense first proposed by Dixit and Norman (1980, 4:109). 
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labour cost requires a higher relative price of X.  Less of X is demanded and hence less labour 
is required, yielding a lower aggregate employment ratio and some unemployment, U1. 
 Assume the world’s primary factors are divided between the two regions so as ensure 
that both goods are produced in both regions.  Then imagine that the Australian wage is rigid 
and set above its market clearing level, and in the rest of the world the wage is flexible.  
Relative to the market-clearing global equilibrium, the real wage in both regions is higher and 
both industries in both regions become less labour-intensive.  The new equilibrium demands 
less labour globally as indicated by the contraction in the global factor endowment box of 
Figure 2.10  The wage paid in the rest of the world is the same as that paid in Australia but 
there is unemployment of magnitude U1, all of which accrues in Australia.  So long as both 
regions continue to produce both goods, the Australian high wage policy succeeds in raising 
the wage in both regions but the cost in unemployment is borne only at home.  In effect, 
Australia achieves this rise in the global wage by withholding some of its own labour.11
 In the HOS model, therefore, such a policy would not induce further migration since it 
would confer on foreign workers the same wage rise achieved in Australia.  Growth would be 
retarded since Australia’s GDP would be below its full-employment level.  If immigration 
were then to be fostered by means other than a higher relative wage, Australia’s GDP would 
increase without changing wages or prices so long as both goods continued to be produced.  
The same absolute number of workers would remain unemployed in Australia, however. 
 
Achieving a higher real wage through protection of the labour-intensive sector: 
 A higher wage is now sought by the Australian government through trade policy, 
while allowing its labour market to clear and hence avoiding unemployment.  The third 
quadrant in Figure 1 then disappears but the global equilibrium is no longer “integrated”.  
Australia’s domestic terms of trade, , would rise while that in the rest of the world would 
fall as indicated in Figure 3.  By the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, Australia’s real wage would 
also rise and that in the rest of the world would fall.  Both industries in Australia would adopt 
more capital-intensive techniques than their counterparts in the rest of the world and the 
global zone of diversification would shift as indicated in Figure 4.  Australia would import 
less of the labour-intensive good and export less of the other good and, while Australian 
AUP
                                                                                                                                                        
9 This follows the approach of Davis (1998) who explored the consequences of high wages in Europe. 
10 This representation of the integrated global equilibrium is that of Dixit and Norman (1980). 
11 An important associated result from Davis is that, if the US and EU have the same endowments, tastes and 
technology, and they differ only in their labour policies, then the cost in terms of European unemployment of a 
high European wage in autarky is half the corresponding cost under free trade with the US. 
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workers would be better off, their gain would be less than that necessary to compensate the 
losing capital-owners at home and the foreign collective that suffers a deterioration in its 
terms of trade. 
 In the context of the HOS model, then, if the real wage gap between the two regions 
induces migration from the rest of the world to Australia, would this restore global integration 
by depressing the Australian real wage and raising that abroad?  Alternatively, would a finite 
increase in protection induce a finite and unique increase in the labour force through 
immigration?  Although the real wage difference is certainly a credible inducement to 
immigration, as long as the immigration is not sufficient to force Australia to specialise in the 
labour intensive good (such as a shift between E and E’ in Figure 4), it would cause no change 
in Australia’s real wage and hence no unique change in Australia’s labour force can be 
deduced.  This is because the real wage and the terms of trade are linked by the Stolper-
Samuelson relationship of Figures 1 and 3, which depends only on the technologies in the two 
industries and not on factor endowments.12  Since the Australian tariff would drive a constant 
proportional wedge between the domestic and foreign terms of trade, the corresponding 
wedge between the domestic and foreign real wages would be retained no matter how many 
workers relocated, so long as both regions continued to produce both goods. 
 
A quantitative illustration of the HOS small open economy: 
 Since the Australia of 1930 was, as it remains, a small economy by global standards, 
we imagine that the rest of the world is so large that no change taking place in Australia will 
significantly alter the international terms of trade.  The many restrictive HOS assumptions are 
satisfied by the use of Cobb-Douglas technology and CES13 preferences.  The factors are raw 
labour, L, and capital, K (which, as before, could be or include human capital), so that the 
production functions take the form: 
 
(1) 1X XX L K
α α−=  and 1Y YY L Kβ β−= . 
The utility function is 
(2) 
1
X X Y YU C C
λ λ λδ δ −− −⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦ , 
                                                 
12 It also depends, of course, on the assumption that firms select their factor proportions to minimize unit costs. 
13 CES, or constant elasticity of substitution, preferences are chosen here to reflect the fact that, when all goods 
are aggregated into just two groups, they are likely to be gross complements and hence have an elasticity of 
substitution less than the unit value yielded by Cobb-Douglas preferences. 
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where the elasticity of substitution in consumption is then ( )1/ 1σ λ= + .  Maximisation 
subject to the budget constraint yields initial expenditure shares X
σδ −  and Y σδ − as well as an 
index of the home price level, for use as a deflator, that also takes the CES form: 
(3) 
1
1 1 1
X X Y YP p p
σ σ σ σ σδ δ− − − − −⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦  . 
 Cost minimisation in each industry yields the set of unit factor demands, lx, kx, ly, ky, 
each of which depends only on α , β  and the unit factor reward ratio w/r.  Price taking 
behaviour and constant returns to scale give rise to the standard linear conditions from which 
the Stolper-Samuelson relationship of Figure 1 emerges, 
(4) ,X X X Y Y Yp wl rk p wl rk= + = + . 
These also imply a variant on this relationship, between the factor price ratio and the terms of 
trade.  In the case where X is as labour intensive as Y is capital intensive (1.0 0.5α> >  and 
1β α= − ) this takes the simple form: 
(5) 
1
2 1
X
Y
pw
r p
α−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 . 
This relationship illustrates the amplification of terms of trade shocks as they affect factor 
prices, which grows larger the nearer α  is to 0.5 – the more similar the technologies of the 
two industries.  It is the reason for the concavity of the Stolper-Samuelson relationship in 
Figures 1 and 3. 
 To complete the model requires factor endowment constraints, 
(6)  , ,X Y X YL l X l Y K k X k Y= + = +
and the GNP level, 
(7)  GNP wL rK R= + +
where tariff revenue is: 
(8)  , ( ) (X X X Y Y YR p C X p C Yτ τ= − + )−
and Xτ , Yτ  are ad valorem tariff rates, so that the exogenous international prices are: 
(9) * *,
1 1
X Y
X Y
X Y
p pp pτ τ= =+ + . 
 We calibrate this simple model to resemble the Australian economy of 1930, as 
indicated in Table 1.  The two sectors are “industry” (manufacturing and mining) and “all 
other sectors”.  Industry is labour intensive relative to the others and import-competing.  The 
“others” are exporting and more intensive in an amalgam of land and physical capital.  The 
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initial tariff rate on industrial imports is 10%.  There are no export taxes or subsidies.  The 
effects of a tariff increase from 20% to 30% are indicated in Table 2. 
 The power of the tariff rises by 8.3 per cent.  In the HOS world of homogeneous 
products this raises the domestic X price by precisely this proportion.  The Stolper-Samuelson 
effects on factor prices are amplified and yield the expected real wage increase.  Since these 
effects depend only on the change in the domestic terms of trade and the production 
technologies in the two industries, the resulting factor price changes are robust to changes in 
factor endowments so long as the home economy does not specialise.  Three separate 
solutions are derived for the tariff shock.  In the first, factor endowments are fixed and so the 
increased real wage does not induce immigration.  In the other two the labour force is boosted 
by immigrations that raise the labour force and X production enough to render the home 
economy autarkic and, further, to force the home economy to the brink of specialisation in X.  
Note that the Stolper-Samuelson effects in general, and the real wage in particular, are 
unaffected by either immigration.  For such an effect to appear, the immigration would need 
to raise the labour force by more than 126 per cent!  Thus, the HOS model offers no unique 
link between protection and real-wage driven immigration and hence no precise link between 
protection and migration-driven GDP growth. 
 It is of interest, nonetheless, to note that the inclusion of capital income into the model 
ensures, as Table 2 shows, that protection causes a fall in real GDP per worker.  If we assume 
that the number of households dependent on capital income is comparatively small and 
unchanging, the tariff increase clearly reduces average welfare per capita.  Not surprisingly, 
since the home capital stock is fixed, per worker real GDP falls further if subsequent 
immigration is allowed.  Yet this is not inconsistent with the Brigden position, since his claim 
was that welfare should be measured at the level of the median (presumably labour income 
dependent) household.  This household’s real per capita income is raised with the real wage. 
 
4. Growth through Protection in a More General Model 
 Considering its analytical simplicity the HOS model offers a powerful representation 
of trading regions and their behaviour.  Behind the Bridgen Report lay ideas that would have 
embodied a more complex model, however.  It offered no discussion of the role of physical 
capital and might be charitably interpreted as imagining that the growth in Australia’s labour 
supply would simply draw in capital from abroad, presumably at a constant global rate of 
return.  And beyond the Brigden argument, a high domestic wage might be seen as not only 
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raising the median standard of living but also promoting immigration and therefore economic 
expansion.  While these ideas seem realistic, the prominence in the HOS model of the 
“integration zone” does not allow the determination of a unique Australian capital stock or 
labour force that would emerge in response to protection were the international supplies of 
capital and labour elastic.  Some generalisation of the model is required to capture this 
behaviour. 
 We consider the following generalisations: 
i. The HOS model has a closed capital account and trade balance.  If foreign ownership 
of physical capital is to be allowed the balance of payments must be generalised to 
include repatriation of returns on the Current Account and net inflows on the Capital 
Account. 
ii. The assumption of perfect homogeneity of products is unrealistic, particularly at levels 
of aggregation allowing just two product groups, and it is from this assumption that 
stems the indeterminacy of regional factor use.  We allow home and foreign products 
to be differentiated.14 
iii. Because in 1930 Australia’s exports depended heavily on its agricultural and mining 
sectors, which were constrained by fixed factors (land and natural resources), we 
adopt a three sector characterisation that includes a natural resource based industry 
(supplying “NRB goods”) and three primary factors: natural resources, labour and 
capital.15 
iv. Both goods in the HOS model are costlessly traded.  We allow for the comparative 
non-tradability of services by rendering the third sector essentially autarkic with a low 
elasticity of substitution with like services abroad.16 
v. Even with the above generalisations, the model would represent a small open economy 
with its domestic terms of trade still determined externally.  Unrealistically, therefore, 
Australia’s real exchange rate would be unchanged by shocks.  Consistent with our 
adoption of product differentiation, we allow foreigners to substitute imperfectly 
                                                 
14 The approach we use is standard in the general equilibrium modelling literature.  It relies on the separability of 
consumption choices between generic goods on the one hand and amongst regional varieties on the other, and it 
originates with Armington (1969). 
15 Early generalisations of HOS results to three factors by Jones (1971) and Krueger (1977), and the introduction 
of specific factors by Mussa (1974) offered significant advances in explaining observed trading behaviour. 
16 Generalisation of the model to include non-tradable sectors originated with Dornbusch (1974). 
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between Australia’s exports and their own goods.  Shocks, such as increased 
protection, therefore appreciate the real exchange rate.17 
All industries continue to use Cobb-Douglas technology.  The factors are raw labour, L, 
capital, K (which could include human capital), and land, A (including natural resources).  
The production functions take the form: 
(10)  , , , 1,iL iK iAi i i iY L K A i i
β β β= ∀ 3=
j
where the sectors, i, are: raw materials (agriculture and mining, intensive in natural 
resources), manufacturing (intensive in labour) and services (capital intensive relative to 
manufacturing). 
 Cost minimisation in each industry, i, yields the set of unit factor demands, li, ki, and 
ai, which we now generalise as vij, where j indexes the primary factors.  Each of these unit 
factor demands depends only on α and the unit factor rewards wj.  Price taking behaviour and 
constant returns to scale give rise to the standard linear conditions from which the Stolper-
Samuelson relationship emerges, 
(11) 
3
1
i ij
j
p v w
=
= ∑  . 
To complete the supply side of the model requires factor endowment constraints,  
 
3 3
1 1
, ,i i i i i i
i i i
3
1
L l Y K k Y A a Y
= = =
= = =∑ ∑ ∑  
which we generalise to: 
(12) 
3
1
j ij iY
i
V v
=
= ∑ j ∀ . 
GDP at factor cost is then: 
(13) 
3
FC j j
j
GDP w V=∑ . 
 The demand side centres on the collective utility function in gross consumption (of 
both home and imported varieties).  Here we use Cobb-Douglas preferences: 
(14) 
3
1
i
i
i
U Cδ
=
=∏  , 
                                                 
17 This “almost small” open economy characterisation is now the standard in single economy models.  It 
originates with Dixon et al. (1977). 
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where the iδ  are expenditure shares on the three goods.18  When the collective household 
maximises this subject to its budget constraint we obtain the usual Cobb-Douglas Marshallian 
demand functions: 
(15) j j
j
GNPC
P
δ=  
where jP  is the composite price (combining home and imported varieties) of the generic good 
j, and GNP is 
(16)  , FC FGNP GDP R rK KA= + − +
where the third term is repatriated capital returns, KA is the (exogenous) net inflow on the 
capital account of the balance of payments and R is import tariff revenue: 
(17) 
3
i i
i
R T M=∑  
in which the Tis are ad-valorem tariff rates. 
 Next we add the product differentiation by country of origin.  The alterations are all on 
the demand side.  Utility is still Cobb-Douglas but now home products and imports are 
differentiated and so the home consumer chooses amongst 3x2 or six goods instead of three.  
Armington (1969) separability is assumed, so that the consumer first makes a choice as to 
how to divide expenditure between the three generic goods and, separately, chooses how to 
divide expenditure on each generic good between the home and imported variety. 
 Thus, utility in the three generic goods is as for equation (14), and for each of the 
generic goods consumption volume (upper case) is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
composite of home products and imports: 
(18) ( ) 1*C h mρ ρ ργ γ −− −= +  
where h and m (lower case) are the volumes of consumption of the home produced and 
imported varieties.  The elasticity of substitution between these is then ( )1/ 1σ ρ= +  and the 
database shares of each in total expenditure on the composite are s σγ=  and ( ) ( )1 *s σγ− = .  
Choosing C1 and C2 to maximise utility subject to the budget constraint and then choosing to h 
and m for each to minimise expenditure yields the Marshallian demands for the home and 
imported varieties: 
                                                 
18 Preferences, as represented here, are homothetic, so that all goods are equally income elastic.  In reality, 
industrial goods and services were probably income elastic relative to natural resourced based goods. 
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(19) ( ) *, 1p ph Cs m C s
P P
σ σ− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= = −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  
where p is the home and p* the (after tariff) import price.  The composite price, P (upper 
case), is a CES index of the home and imported product prices: 
(20) ( ) 111 * 1*P p pσ σσ σ σγ γ −− −⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
Both home products are exported and both foreign products are imported.  
International market clearance therefore requires that, for each commodity, any surplus of 
home variety output over home consumption is exported.  Foreign goods are infinitely elastic 
in supply to the home economy at the prices, pF.  The domestic price of the imported good is 
then: 
(21) ( )* 1 Fp pτ= +  . 
Finally, to deflate incomes for calculating real unit factor rewards, the consumer price index 
is a function of the composite (upper case) prices: 
(22) 
3
1
i
i
i
CPI Pδ
=
=∏  
 Next is the construction of export demand as to achieve the “almost small” 
characterisation.  Foreign consumption of all three good types is held fixed at Q, the CES 
composite of home and foreign goods: 
(23) 
** ** FQ X C
ρρ ρλ λ −− −⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦  
with the shares of home product in foreign consumption Es σλ= .  Foreigners then choose 
home exports, X, and their consumption of their own products, CF, to minimise the cost of 
their bundle, Q.  Export demand is then given by: 
(24) 
*
F
F
pX s Q
P
σ−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, 
where * 1/(1 *)σ ρ= +  is the elasticity of substitution abroad and the foreign composite price 
(upper case) is 
(25) 
( )1/ 1 ** 1 * * * 1 *
F FP p p
σσ σ σ σλ λ −− −⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦ . 
Table 3 spells out the values assigned to the parameters and the initial values of the 
key variables.  The resulting model “database” offers a stylised representation of the 
Australian economy in 1930.  The three sectors supply natural-resource-based (“NRB”) 
goods, which include the products of the agricultural, mineral and energy sectors, industrial 
 14
goods (mainly manufactures) and little-traded services.  In models with product 
differentiation according to region of origin, results can be quite sensitive to the magnitudes 
of elasticities of substitution.  For the traded goods sectors, we adopt larger numbers than are 
commonly used in medium run policy analysis to reflect the long run perspective taken by the 
Brigden Report.  Foreigners, whose larger markets allow greater product diversity, substitute 
more readily between the home and foreign varieties of the tradable goods than do domestic 
consumers.  There is intra-industry trade in all three sectors, though its magnitude is miniscule 
in services.  Ad valorem tariffs apply to the imports of all three, but their level is greatest on 
the comparatively labour intensive industrial imports, at 20%. 
Our key experiment is to double the industrial tariff rate.  The results are presented in 
Table 4.  Three model closures are adopted.  In the first we make the conventional assumption 
that the endowments of all three primary factors are fixed and that these factors are fully 
employed.  Their associated unit rewards are therefore endogenous.  In the other two, the unit 
rewards are fixed and total factor use is endogenous.  Unlike in the HOS model, the nexus 
between the tariff and the domestic terms of trade is broken here by product differentiation.  
Consequently, if migration is free at a given wage and capital is internationally mobile at a 
given rental rate, specific protection instruments induce finite levels of immigration, along 
with inflows that finance explicit levels of physical capital acquisition. 
When the factor endowments are exogenous, as in the first column of Table 4, the 
spirit of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem is preserved in that the wage rises relative to the 
other factor rewards and relative to product prices.  Relative to the (fixed) foreign prices, the 
level of domestic product prices rise – there is a real appreciation.19  This serves to amplify 
the contraction of the NRB sector, since it reduces exports of NRB goods, and hence the 
associated reduction in natural resource rents.  Overall, the protection increase has the 
conventional effect of reducing both real GDP and real GNP. 
When the capital rental rate and the real wage are made exogenous and the associated 
endowments endogenous, the tariff increase expands the economy substantially.  The labour 
endowment rises as the new protection increases industrial labour demand and this demand is 
met from abroad.  More labour raises the demand for physical capital, attracting investment, 
also from abroad.  The output of the industrial sector more than doubles and there are also 
                                                 
19 The added protection reduces both imports and exports and the fall in the latter, by withdrawing supply from 
the rest of the world, drives up the home price of industrial goods.  The expansion of that sector tightens the 
labour market, but since the little-traded yet larger services sector is also labour intensive, the wage rise must 
also raise its domestic price. 
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important increases in services output.20  Increased aggregate demand serves to offset the 
declines in natural resource rents of Column 1 of the table.  Real GDP expands by between a 
quarter and a third.  The added protection is indeed expansionary in this economy. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 illustrate the importance of the approach taken to the 
setting of the exogenous real wage and the capital rental rate.  We have chosen to set the 
capital rental rate constant relative to (fixed) international (import) prices, since any increment 
in the capital stock is foreign owned and real rental payments are assessed by the foreign 
owners relative to foreign prices.  The real wage is set relative to a domestic price index, 
however, on the assumption that workers relocate permanently and their decision to relocate 
is not dependent on the purchasing power of remittances abroad.  The question, then, is which 
domestic price index to use.  This is non-trivial since the tariff increase, combined with the 
non-homogeneity of imported with domestic products, raises the consumer price level by 
more than the GDP price.  In column 2 of Table 4, it is assumed that the domestic wage is set 
on domestic supply side criteria, to maintain a constant production real wage.  Because of the 
divergence between the domestic indices, the real consumption wage falls slightly in this case.  
In column 3 of Table 4, labour is assumed to be supplied abroad with infinite elasticity at a 
constant consumption real wage.  In this case, the production real wage rises, so that there is a 
smaller uptake of migrant labour and of foreign capital and hence a smaller overall expansion 
of the economy. 
To explore the effects of the tariff on economic size a little more generally, we 
examine the effects of changing the tariff rate to new values ranging from zero to 50 per cent.  
The continuous relationship between the tariff and measures of economic size is illustrated in 
Figure 5.  When migrant labour is attracted at a constant real production wage, the 
relationships are non-linear but monotonic.  At the high end of tariff rates they are asymptotic 
at economic size levels roughly double those at zero rates.  This is because the high tariffs 
eventually eliminate all manufactured imports.  It is also because the domestic endowment of 
capital is constant, so that the more foreign capital is absorbed, the larger the burden of 
repatriated capital income on the current account. 
Interestingly, when the wage is held constant relative to the domestic consumer price 
level, the relationship between the tariff rate and economic size becomes non-monotonic, as 
shown in Figure 6.  At very low levels of the tariff the consumer price level is low compared 
                                                 
20 Our model lacks intermediate demand.  Were this to be included, the service expansion might have been larger 
than that indicated in Table 4, since services are key inputs to the industrial sector.  Indeed, the expansion of 
services might have been larger still had preferences been non-homothetic and services more income-elastic than 
the other products. 
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with the GDP price.21  This means that, when the tariff is reduced from its initial value of 20 
per cent, the real production wage falls and labour demand increases, most strongly when the 
tariff ends up below five per cent.  Completely removing the tariff would therefore expand the 
economy almost as substantially as raising it in this case.  What is clear, however, is that, 
according to this model, more than doubling the tariff of the day would have increased most 
measures of economic size by about a third. 
 Finally, returning to Brigden’s assertion that raising the tariff would improve the 
“standard of living”, we note that the result from this model is the same in direction as that 
from the HOS model of the previous section.  The final row of Table 4 shows that, real wage 
increases notwithstanding, real GDP per worker still falls.  In this case, however, both labour 
and capital are made internationally mobile in the latter two experiments (columns of the 
table).  Capital flows in along with the labour, though in smaller volume because the protected 
sector is labour-intensive.  Nonetheless, in spite of the extra capital, the post-migration 
declines in real GNP per worker remain substantial.  Once again, however, these results are 
not inconsistent with the Brigden assertion on the “standard of living”, since his claim was 
that welfare should be measured at the level of the median (labour income dependent) 
household.  For this household real per capita income is again boosted by the real wage 
increases. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 We explore the Brigden Commission’s conclusion that raising the tariff on industrial 
goods in Australia would improve the median (worker) “standard of living”.  We then proceed 
beyond the Commission’s analysis, using models that post-dates it, to examine the effects of 
additional protection on Australia’s labour force and overall economic size when labour is 
elastic in supply from abroad.  That a higher tariff would raise the real wage is broadly 
consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem in the context of the model of Heckscher, 
Ohlin and Samuelson, which was formalised more than two decades following the Brigden 
Report.  Yet, with this model, it is impossible to draw a unique link between an industrial 
tariff and the real wage change it causes on the one hand and the associated factor inflows on 
the other.  This stems from the model’s assumption of product homogeneity and hence from 
its embodiment of a “zone of diversification” within which there is no unique regional 
allocation of primary factors to match the terms of trade and the factor prices of the 
                                                 
21 Reducing the tariff by 90%, for example, reduces the consumer price level by 7% and the GDP price by 3%. 
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“integrating equilibrium”.  Moreover, in the context of the HOS model, any attempt to raise 
the wage directly, via labour market policy, merely confers the benefit of the higher wage on 
workers abroad.  At home, however, while those remaining employed do enjoy the wage 
increase, a pool of unemployment is created. 
 To draw the link between industrial tariffs, factor prices and factor endowments 
requires a generalisation of the model beyond homogeneous products.  We introduce a three-
sector, three-factor model that has home products differentiated from imports, foreign-owned 
capital, one essentially non-traded sector, one sector constrained by a fixed factor (natural 
resources) and an “almost small” structure that allows real exchange rate changes.  When this 
model is calibrated to resemble the Australian economy of 1929-30 with both labour and 
capital considered elastic in supply from abroad, the raising of a tariff on industrial imports 
achieves doubles real GDP.  The tariff is definitely expansionary in this context. 
 We hasten to note that this is not to advocate such a policy in modern Australia.  
Rather, we claim that the economic intuition of the Brigden Commission ran beyond the 
economic modelling capabilities of its day and that its recommendations made sense beyond 
the comparative static “median standard of living” criterion.  For a settler economy, such as 
that of Australia at the time, growth would depend on worker immigration and this, in turn, 
would depend on the real wage.  Of course, the Great Depression was soon to grip the world 
and a fallacy of composition emerged.  Most trading countries sought to increase their 
protection, causing a disastrous downward spiral in trade and economic interdependence. 
 Moreover, recent improvements to modelling economic behaviour have shown the 
many detriments of protection not accounted for either by the Brigden Commission or our 
analysis.  At least in part it is for this reason that the high levels of inter-war protection in 
Australia and elsewhere have since largely been rolled back, both by negotiation and 
unilateral reform.  Reducing protection has been shown to have “pro-competitiveness” effects 
in oligopolistic industries as firms perceive smaller market shares.  Increased competitive 
pressure stimulates R&D sectors that yield productivity gains.  The wasteful rent seeking 
engendered by protection is also reduced and, finally, reduced taxation of manufactured 
imports frees up capital goods imports that embody technological advances.  For all these 
reasons, the vision of the Brigden Commission does not apply to the modern era, though it 
was sophisticated for its day. 
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Figure 3 
      /X YP p p=  
 
 
               PAU   Tariff wedge 
 
 
      P0
  Stopler-Samuelson     Heckscher-Ohlin 
 
 
             PRoW
 
               // YW w p= L Kρ =  
          WAU          W0      WRoW       AUρ    0ρ          Eρ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
              ORoW
    WK  
 
 
 
       'Yρ      Yρ  
 
       Capital 
 
 
 
    E       E’ 
 
       'Xρ  
          Xρ  
 
       OAU                WL  
      Labour 
 
 22
Figure 5: Economic Expansion due to the Tariff when the Real Production 
Wage is Held Constant 
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Figure 6: Economic Expansion due to the Tariff when the Real 
Consumption Wage is Held Constant 
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Table 1: The HOS Representationa 
 
Variables and base values Key parameters 
Variable Base value Parameter Value 
    
Volumes:  Share parameters  
Output, X 37.4 Share of labour in X, α  0.75 
Output, Y 71.1 Share of labour in Y, β  0.40 
Consn, CX 62.2 Expenditure share on X, δ  0.5 
Consn, CY 52.7   
Exports, X 0.0 Elasticities   
Exports, Y 18.4 Elasticity of substn X vs Y, σ  0.5 
Imports, X 24.8   
Imports, Y 0.0 Ad valorem tariffs  
  Tariff on X imports, TX 0.2 
Values:  Tariff on Y imports, TY 0.0 
GDP 212.2   
Export value 36.0   
Import value 36.0   
Tariff revenue 7.2   
    
Quantities    
L supply 105   
K stock 100   
    
Prices:    
w 1.0   
r 1.0   
p
X
1.75   
p
Y
1.96   
pX* 1.46   
pY* 1.96   
CPI 1.86   
a  All base values and volumes have arbitrary units since they are constructed on unit factor prices.  They do, 
however imply GDP shares of individual product output and trade that resemble those of the Australian economy 
in 1929-30.  Note that, for this purpose, the X industry includes manufacturing, mining and construction and the 
Y industry the rest of the economy.  The X industry has just under a third of GDP and the value of Y industry 
exports is 17 % of GDP. 
Source: Industry shares of GDP and factor shares of value added are from Butlin (1985) and Withers et al. 
(1985) and trade shares are from the Overseas Trade Bulletin No.20, 1931-32 (Commonwealth Government 
Printing Office). 
 24
Table 2: HOS Numerical Results for the Home Economy 
 
% change over reference equilibrium  
 
 
Variable 
Raise Xτ  to 30% Raise Xτ  to 30% 
Immigration to 
autarky 
Raise Xτ  to 30% 
Immigration to 
specialisation in X 
Prices:    
      p
X 8.3 8.3 8.3 
      p
Y 0.0 0.0 0.0 
     CPI 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Real factor prices:    
     w/CPI 10.3 10.3 10.3 
     r/CPI -12.3 -12.3 -12.3 
Quantities:    
     Labour endowment 0.0 5.9 126 
     X 43.5 60.8 408 
     Y -21.4 -25.0 -100 
     X imports -79.0 -100 -516a
     Y exports -79.0 -100 -516a
Values:    
     Real Tariff revenue, R/CPI -71.6 -100 -721a
     Real GDP, GDP/CPI -3.0 -0.8 44.1 
     Real GDP per worker -3.0 -6.3 -36.2 
a  When the economy specialises in X production, it must import all its consumption of Y (where once it exported 
Y) and, to pay for this, it exports X.  For this reason both trade flows reverse sign.  Consequently, the upward 
distortion of the domestic X price then takes the form of an export subsidy, so the tariff revenue also changes 
sign. 
Source: Experiments using the numerical HOS model described in the text. 
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Table 3: The Three Sector, Three Factor Representation 
 
Variables and base values Key parameters 
Variable Base value Parameter Value 
Volumes:  Share parameters  
Output, NRB goods 44.0 Labour sharesb , Lβ  – NRB goods 0.50 
             Industry 52.1                                   - Industry 0.75 
             Services 103.0                                    - Services 0.60 
Exports, NRB goods 20.6   
             Industry 4.9 Capital sharesb Kβ in – NRB goods 0.20 
             Services 0.5                                     - Industry 0.25 
Imports, NRB goods 5.8                                     - Services 0.40 
             Industry 47.2   
             Services 1.0 Expenditure shares, δ , NRB goods 0.18 
                                        Industry 0.37 
Values:                                        Services 0.46 
GDP 445.3   
GNPc 467.3 Home shares, s              NRB goods  0.80 
Capital inflowc 74.0                                       Industry 0.50 
Net income repatriation 52.0                                       Services 0.99 
Export value 67.6   
Import value 89.6 Home shares in RoW, sF, NRB goods 0.01 
Tariff revenue 15.3                                         Industry 0.01 
                                          Services 0.0001 
Quantities    
L supply 260 Elasticities   
K stock 130 Home subst elast, σ ,    NRB goods 10.0 
Foreign owned K 52                                        Industrys 7.0 
Land and natural resources 40                                        Services 0.5 
    
Prices:  Foreign subst elast, *σ , NRB goods 20.0 
Wage, capital & land rent 1.00                                         Industrys 14.0 
Price    NRB goods 2.80                                         Services 0.5 
             Industry 1.83   
             Services 2.05 Ad valorem import tariffs  
Border (imp) price, NRB goods 2.67 Tariffs on imports, T,      NRB goods 0.05 
                    Industry 1.53                                         Industry 0.20 
                   Services 1.96                                         Services 0.05 
Consumer price level, CPI 2.08   
GDP priced 1.00   
Real exchange ratee 1.00   
a  All base values and volumes have arbitrary units since they are constructed on unit factor prices.  They do, 
however imply GDP shares of individual product output and trade that resemble those of the Australian economy 
in 1929-30. 
B  The natural resource share in production of NRB goods is the complement of the corresponding labour and 
capital shares. 
C  Because the model has no saving and investment is consolidated with consumption, net inflows on the capital 
account are treated as unrequited transfers on the current account.  As such, they add to GNP as measured in the 
model.  Since they exceed net income outflows on the capital account, GNP is raised above GDP. 
D  The GDP price is defined as unity initially and subsequently adjusted as a weighted average of producer 
prices. 
E  The real exchange rate is defined as the value of the home production bundle in terms of the corresponding 
foreign production bundle, where the initial values of both bundles are unity. 
Source: Industry shares of GDP and factor shares of value added are from Butlin (1985) and Withers et al. 
(1985) and trade shares are from the Overseas Trade Bulletin No.20, 1931-32. 
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Table 4: The Effects of Increased Protection in the Three Sector Model 
 
% change over reference equilibrium ( Industryτ =20%)  
 
 
Variable 
Industryτ  to 40% 
Fixed factor 
endowments 
Industryτ  to 40% 
Fixed rental rate, 
Fixed production real 
wagea
Industryτ  to 40% 
Fixed rental rate, 
Fixed consn real 
wagea
Prices:    
After tariff border price, p*    
        NRB goods 0.0 0.0 0.0 
        Industry 16.7 16.7 16.7 
       Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Home product price, p    
        NRB goods 1.2 0.6 0.7 
        Industry 10.6 0.3 1.8 
       Services 10.1 0.2 1.4 
Consumer price level, CPI 9.3 1.3 2.4 
GDP price, PY 7.7 0.4 1.3 
Real factor prices:    
      a/ PY -23.9 1.2 -3.0 
      w/ PY 3.7 0.0 1.1 
      r/ PY 0.8 -0.4 -1.3 
      a/ CPI -25.0 0.2 -4.1 
      w/ CPI 2.2 -1.0 0.0 
      r/ CPI 0.7 -1.3 -2.4 
Quantities:    
Factor endowments    
      Natural resources 0.0 0.0 0.0 
      Labour 0.0 43.4 34.8 
      Capital 0.0 35.0 30.1 
Output    
       NRB goods -22.1 -3.4 -6.4 
       Industry 35.9 122.8 107.0 
       Services -3.9 21.5 16.7 
Imports    
       NRB goods 32.1 37.2 34.9 
       Industry -60.8 -94.6 -92.6 
       Services 0.8 21.7 17.7 
Exports    
       NRB goods -44.9 -26.9 -29.1 
       Industry -99.3 -13.1 -59.2 
       Services -4.7 -0.1 -0.7 
Values:    
Real tariff revenue, R/ CPI -27.3 -83.4 -80.7 
Real GDP, GDP/ PY -0.6 32.7 26.5 
Real GDP per worker -0.6 -7.5 -6.2 
Real GNP, GNP/ CPI -3.3 20.3 15.7 
Real GNP per worker -3.3 -16.1 -14.2 
a  The rental rate is fixed relative to international prices.  The production real wage is fixed when the wage rate is 
held constant relative to the GDP price.  The consumption real wage is fixed when the wage rate is held constant 
relative to the consumer price level, the CPI. 
Source: Experiments using the three-sector model described in the text. 
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